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MR. JUSTICE MURPHY AND CML RIGHTS

Thurgood Marshall*
HERE is constant danger that the unpopularity of an individual,
or of the group of which he is a member, will be reflected in
dealings with his rights by his neighbors or by the organized
community. In America today this bias is most likely to stern from
differences of race, origin, nationality, or religious or political belief.
Prejudice may victimize an entire group or any of its members. Any
charge of shocking or anti-social conduct against one who is already
thus unpopular increases the likelihood of unfair treatment. Not only
private citizens, but legislators, judges and administrative officers of
government are prone to such prejudicial attitudes and behavior.
To secure those thus disadvantaged against imposition is a major
function of the Constitution and of the Supreme Court as the final
exponent and enforcer of fundamental law and its supremacy.
Certainly no Justice who sat with Mr. Justice Murphy would
disagree with what has been said in these introductory paragraphs.
None of Mr. Justice Murphy's brethren would concede himself to
have a less genuine devotion to the equalitarian principles of our
fundamental law or a less sincere desire that those principles be translated into specific precept and strictly enforced.
But, in the field of civil rights, Mr. Justice Murphy was a zealot.
To him, the primacy of civil rights and human equality in our law
and their entitlement to every possible protection in each case, regardless of competing considerations, was a fighting faith. Among his
brethren were those who might on occasion accept a substantial abridgement of free speech for the better vindication of other interests of
social importance. Considered limitations of expediency upon efforts
to enforce very high standards of fairness in state courts might appear
controlling to others. Still others might defer to legislative judgment
in close cases of interference with basic individual rights. But Mr.
Justice Murphy's orientation in matters of civil liberties was fixed. His
sense of values was unchanging. He followed wherever his abiding
conviction of the primacy of civil rights might lead. Of him one writer
has said:
"Mr. Justice Murphy was a great judge because of three
qualities. The first was simplicity; the second was courage; the
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third was insight into the. substance of the problems of the changing times in which he lived."1
It was most particularly in the field now under discussion that these
qualities were demonstrated.
Mr. Justice Murphy came to the Supreme Court with a background
of complete support for individual rights and a determination to oppose
vigorously discriminatory governmental action as well as hostile action
of individuals. His earlier judicial experience was highlighted by the
trial of the famous Sweet case in Recorders Court in Detroit, Michigan.
That case involved the acquittal of Negro Americans charged with
murder in the killing of a member of a mob which threatened the
family and friends of Dr. Sweet who had moved into a so-called white
neighborhood. This trial will always be remembered for the brilliant
defense conducted by Clarenc·e Darrow and the complete fairness of
Judge Frank Murphy.
While mayor of the City of Detroit during the depression, he
demonstrated a determination to use all of the resources of the city
for the welfare of the large group of its unemployed residents. As
Governor of the State of Michigan, he refused to remove the sit-down
strikers at the automobile plants on the grounds that to do so would
bring about bloodshed on both sides. As Attorney General of the
United States, he will always be remembered for having set up and put
into motion the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice for
the purposes of enforcing the civil rights statutes of the United
States and of protecting the civil rights of Americans throughout the
country. This varied experience developed his keen insight for the
problems which he was to face in his tenure on the Supreme Court.
A consideration of the major cases involving fundamental issues
affecting the civil rights of unpopular minorities will clearly demonstrate Justice Murphy's contribution to the basic law of the land.
In his majority opinions, Mr. Justice Murphy consistently insisted
upon the fullest protection of individual rights. Regardless of the other
issues involved he always felt that the proper approach was to
consider all other problems in the light of the constitutional right
being asserted. Even in cases where the asserted right was not sustained, his approach made it necessary for the majority of the Court
to consider and pass upon its merits.
One of the first opinions of Mr. Justice Murphy was written in
the case of Thornhill v. Alabama.2 In considering the claimed right
1
2

Arnold, "Mr. Justice Murphy," 63 HAB.v. L. R.Bv. 289 at 293 (1949).
310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736 (1940).
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involved, Mr. Justice Murphy, after reviewing prior decisions to the
effect that freedom of speech and press secured by the First Amendment are fundamental rights and liberties guaranteed all persons under
the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgement by a state, said:
"It is imperative that, when the effective exercise of these
rights is claimed to be abridged, the courts should 'weigh the
circumstances' and 'appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced' in support of the challenged regulations."3
After reviewing the State of Alabama's claim that the anti-picketing
statute was necessary to prevent the evils arising from industrial dispute, Murphy exposed the illogic of this statement. The State, he
held, could not for this reason impair the effective exercise of the
freedom to discuss matters of public concern such as industrial relations, for the same argument could likewise be used to support abridgement of freedom of speech and of the press concerning almost every
such matter of general public concern and importance. The State
claimed that the restrictive statute was necessary to prevent peaceful
picketing from influencing persons to refrain from doing business with
the "picketed" business. Justice Murphy recognized that every expression of opinion on matters important to society had the potentiality of
inducing action or interest of one rather than another group in society.
In weighing the two claims he concluded:
"Abridgment of the liberty of such discussion can be justified
only where the clear danger of substantive evils arises under circumstances affording no opportunity to test the merits of ideas by
competition for acceptance in the market of public opinion. We
hold that the danger of injury to an industrial concern is neither
so serious nor so imminent as to justify the sweeping proscription
of freedom of discussion embodied in §3448."4

In the Carl.son case,5 decided the same day, Murphy restated the
rule in the Thornhill case as giving affirmative protection to the right
of peaceful picketing as follows:
". . . publicizing the facts of a labor dispute in a peaceful
way through appropriate means, whether by pamphlet, by word
of mouth or by banner, must now be regarded as within that
liberty of communication which is secured to every person by the
Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a State."6
3

Id. at 96.
Id. at 104-105.
Ii Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. 746 (1940).
6 1d. at 113.

4
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The opinion in the Thornhill case has had a far-reaching impact on
labor-management relations throughout the country. The decision
has been cited more than three hundred times in published reports.
It has given substantial and important protection to organized labor
in its never-ending struggle for better working conditions. Both as to
the number of persons affected and the problem involved, it is in many
respects, one of the most important decisions of the Supreme Court.
On the question of freedom of the press, in concurring opinions
in Pennekamp v. Florida' and Craig v. Harney,8 Murphy recognized
that the freedom of the press covered something more than the right
merely to approve and condone insofar as the judiciary is concerned;
it included the right to criticize and disparage the judicial process
free from the threat of a contempt conviction. The rule as advanced
by Murphy was that:
"Judges should be foremost in their vigilance to protect the
freedom of others to rebuke and castigate the bench and in. their
refusal to be influenced by unfair or ~isinformed censure. Otherwise freedom may rest upon the precarious base of judicial sensitiveness and caprice. And a chain reaction may be set up, resulting in countless restrictions and limitations upon liberty."0
The answer suggested by Murphy to the problem involved is that:
"Silence and a steady devotion to duty are the best answers
to irresponsible criticism; and those judges who feel the need
for giving a more visible demonstration of their feelings may take
advantage of various laws passed for that purpose which do not
impinge upon a free press. The liberties guaranteed by the First
Amendment, however, are too highly prized to be subjected to
the hazards of summary contempt procedure."10
One of the opinions by Mr. J-µstice Murphy during his last term
again emphasizes his position as to judicial restraint in contempt
actions. In the case of Fisher v. Pace,11 Murphy, in dissenting from
affirmance of a contempt order against an attorney who had objected
in open court to what he considered unfair conduct of the trial judge,
pointed out that there had been no substantial interference with the
trial itself and that the action of the trial judge was a denial of due
process.
328 U.S. 331, 66 S.Ct. 1029 (1946).
s 331 U.S. 367, 67 S.Ct. 1249 (1947).
9 Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 at 370, 66 S.Ct. 1029 (1946).
10 Craigv. Hamey, 331 U.S. 367 at 383-384, 67 S.Ct. 1249 (1947) •
11 336 U.S. 155, 69 S.Ct. 425 (1949).
7

•
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He stated that the record of petty disagreements in the pending
case did not approach the serious interference of judicial process which
justifies the use of contempt proceeding and concluded: 'The contempt
power is an extraordinary remedy, an exception to our tradition of
fair and complete hearings. Its use should be carefully restricted to
cases of actual obstruction."12
In criminal cases, Murphy was most insistent that the Supreme
Court exercise its supervisory and review jurisdiction in such a
manner as to give the fullest protection to individual rights. His zeal
and determination have been evident in majority, dissenting and concurring opinions. These opinions have been intended as guide posts
for state and federal courts.
Speaking for the majority of the Court in- Glasser v. United States,
Murphy stated:
"In all cases the constitutional safeguards are to be jealously
preserved for the benefit of the accused, but especially is this true
where the scales of justice may be delicately poised between guilt
and innocence. Then error, which under some circumstances
would not be ground for reversal, cannot be brushed aside as immaterial, since there is a real chance that it might have provided
the slight impetus which swung the scales toward guilt."13
This opinion gave a clearer meaning to the constitutional guarantee
of right of counsel in criminal cases. Even where the defendant himself was a lawyer and the record did not show a clear preservation of
the objection to having appointed counsel represent conllicting interests
of two defendants, Murphy placed the duty upon the trial judge of
seeing that the trial was conducted with solicitude for the essential
rights of the accused. He refused to permit this right of counsel to be
nullified by technical distinctions:
"To determine the precise degree of prejudice sustained by
Glasser as a result of the court's appointment of Stewart as counsel
for Kretske is at once difficult and unnecessary. The right to have
the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow
courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice
arising from its denial."14
Again in one of the dissenting opinions in Carter v. Illinois,15
Murphy demonstrated his deep conviction that legal technicalities
12 Id.

at 167.

1s Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 at 67, 62 S.Ct 457 (1942).
14 Id. at 75-76.
1r; 329 U.S. 173,

67 S.Ct. 216 (1946).
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should not prevent the Supreme Court from enforcing constitutional
guarantees:
"Legal technicalities doubtless afford justification for our
pretense of ignoring plain facts before us, facts upon which a
man's very life or liberty conceivably could depend. Moreover,
there probably is legal warrant for our not remanding the case
to the Supreme Court of Illinois to allow those facts to be incorporated in the formal record before it and to reconsider its decision
in light thereof. But the result certainly does not enhance the
high traditions of the judicial process."16
After noting that the defendant, "an uneducated, bewildered layman," was called upon to read and interpret a five-page indictment
and to plead guilty or not guilty, Murphy gave expression to his concern for the security of the protective cloak provided for even the
illiterate or uneducated by the due process clause of the Constitution
and his conviction as to the Court's function in this regard when he
stated:
"He was compelled to weigh the factors involved in a guilty
plea against those resulting from the submission of his case to a
jury. He was forced to judge the chances of setting up a successful defense. These are all complicated matters that only a man
versed in the legal lore could hope to comprehend and to decide
intelligently. Petitioner obviously was not of that type. Yet at
this crucial juncture petitioner lacked the aid and guidance of
such a person. In my view, it is a gross miscarriage of justice to
condemn a man to death or to life imprisonment in such a
manner."17
Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment the Supreme
Court has always insisted that Negroes may not be systematically
excluded from jury service. However, Mr. Justice Murphy insisted
that a broader view be taken to prevent exclusion of any class of people
from jury service:
''The American tradition of trial by jury, considered in connection with either criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily
contemplates an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the
community. . . . This does not mean, of course, that every jury
must contain representatives of all the economic, social, religious,
racial, political and geographical groups of the community; frequently such complete representation would be impossible. But
it does mean that prospective jurors shall be selected by court
1s Id. at 183.
17 Id. at

185.

1950]

JusncE MuRPHY AND CIVIL RIGHTS

751

officials without systematic and intentional exclusion of any of
these groups. Recognition must be given to the fact that those
eligible for jury service are to be found in ever:y stratum of society.
Jury competence is an individual rather than a group or class
matter. That fact lies at the very heart of the jury system. To
disregard it is to open the door to class distinctions and discriminations which are abhorrent to the democratic ideals of trial by
jury."18
Murphy consistently expressed his view that race, religion and
class were irrelevant factors which may not be constitutionally considered in selecting juries. He clearly indicated his view that the issue
to be considered was broader than mere exclusion:
"Racial limitation no less than racial exclusion in the formation of juries is an evil condemned by the equal protection
clause....
"If a jury is to be fairly chosen from a cross section of the
community it must be done without limiting the number of
persons of a particular color, racial background or faith-all of
which are irrelevant factors in setting qualifications for jury
service. This may in a particular instance result in the selection
of one, six, twelve or even no Negroes on a jury panel. The
important point, however, is that the selections must in no way
be limited or restricted by such irrelevant factors.'>1 9

In his dissent in the ''blue ribbon" jury case,20 Murphy again
urged the Court to insist upon juries being drawn from a cross-section
of the community. He disagreed with the majority opinion mainly
because he believed that the fact that it was difficult to prove that the
petitioners in the case were prejudiced thereby, should not preclude
the Court from declaring "blue ribbon" juries invalid. To Murphy
the protection of our jur:y system was more. important than procedural
difficulties of the particular case. He believed that it was impossible
to measure accurately the prejudice in a particular case by the exclusion of certain types of qualified people from juries. Murphy pointed
out that prejudice may be absent in one case and present in another,
and that "it may gradually and silently erode the jury system before it
becomes evident." He concluded: "If the constitutional right to a jury
impartially drawn from a cross-section of the community has been violated, we should vindicate that right even though the effect of the viola1s Thie1 v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 at 220, 66 S.Ct. 984 (1946).
19 Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 at 408-409, 65 S.Ct. 1276 (1945).
20Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 67 S.Ct. 1613 (1947).
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tion has not yet put in a tangible appearance. Otherwise that right may
be irretrievably lost in a welter of evidentiary rules." 21
In the opinions which Murphy either wrote or joined concerning
the validity of convictions based upon coerced confessions, his clear
perception of realism is consistent. In Lyons v. Oklahoma22 the petitioner admittedly had been coerced into signing a confession of murder.
The majority found that the long and oppressive coercion and intimidation which led up to such a confession need not necessarily have
influenced the subsequent confession admitted at petitioner's trial.
Murphy, in dissenting, did away with the niceties involved in attempting to weigh the effect of earlier brutality upon the subsequent
admitted confession, saying: "To conclude that the brutality inflicted
at the time of the first confession suddenly lost all of its effect in the
short space of twelve hours is to close one's eyes to the realities of
human nature."23
Six years later, majority opinions in three confession cases24 show
that Murphy had won over a majority of the Court to his realistic
approach to a consideration of the facts and circumstances in alleged
coerced confessions. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in the Watts
case stated in part: "We would have to shut our minds to plain significance of what here transpired to deny that this was a calculated
endeavor to secure a confession through the pressure of unrelenting
.
. "
mterrogat:Ion.
Mr. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in the Watts case indicates
that, in the interim since Lyons v. Oklahoma wherein he had joined
the majority, he has adopted the views of Mr. Justice Murphy. In the
Watts case, after reviewing the factual situation obtaining prior
to the confession, Douglas said, "It would have been naive to think
that this protective custody was less than the Inquisition."
Mr. Justice Murphy played an important role in opposing efforts
to limit the use of habeas corpus proceedings in state and federal
courts. Prisoners convicted of various crimes have in most instances
found themselves with court records in which federal questions have
not been properly raised, and in many cases these prisoners have been
without funds to employ lawyers. In many such instances there have
been federal questions which, if properly raised, would have brought
Id. at 300.
322 U.S. 596, 64 S.Ct. 1208 (1944).
2s Id. at 606.
24 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct. 1347 (1949); Harris v. South Carolina,
338 U.S. 68, 69 S.Ct. 1354 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62, 69 S.Ct.
1352 (1949).
21
22
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about reversals. Cases of this type have consistently resulted in a clear
division of the Court. One group has insisted upon rigid application
of all procedural rules concerning habeas corpus, exhaustion of state
remedies, clear presentation of the federal question and the authority
of local, state and federal courts to dismiss petitions for habeas corpus
without hearings on the federal questions presented. In contrast,
Murphy and others have insisted that the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus should not be limited by rigid procedural rules and that while
orderly procedure requires certain rules, they should not be used to
circumvent the basic purpose of the writ to inquire into the legality
of the prisoner's incarceration. Consistently, in such cases, Murphy
has demonstrated his willingness to cut through procedural red tape
to get to the basic question of the petitioner's constitutional rights.
In recent years the Court has recognized the increasing number
of petitions for writs of habeas corpus :filed in federal courts. There
have also been several instances in which the same prisoner has :filed
several petitions for a writ of habeas corpus. The combination of
these two situations brought about a 5-4 decision. In Price v. Johnston, 25
four successive petitions for writs of habeas corpus were £led in the
District Court for the Northern District of California. Price, who
was not a lawyer, had filed them pro se. All four petitions had been
denied without hearings.
The last petition alleged in general language that petitioner had
been denied a fair and impartial trial. After an order to show cause
was issued, the petition was amended to allege " 'that the government
knowingly employed false testimony on the trial, to obtain the conviction.' " 26 The Government's return did not deny this allegation nor
did it question the sufficiency of the allegations of facts. It did incorporate by reference the records of the three prior proceedings and
urged the court to dismiss the petition on the basis of these prior
rulings. The district court denied this fourth petition without a hearing and without opinion.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit ordered up the original :files in the
three previous cases and directed that the petitioner be brought before
the court for the argument of his appeal. After argument, the case
was set for reargument before the court en bane. Petitioner's motion for
permission to appear personally for the reargument was denied. In the
majority opinion of the Ninth Circuit it was concluded that the court
was without power to order the production of a prisoner for argument
25

334 U.S. 266, 68 S.Ct. 1049 (1948).

26

Id. at 275.
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of his appeal in person. One judge believed that the court had such
power but should not have exercised it in this case. Two judges dissented on the ground that there was power to grant the requested
relief. 27 The court then considered the appeal on the briefs
filed by petitioner and respondents and oral argument by the Government. Petitioner was not represented at the oral argument. The
judgment of the district court was affirmed with two judges dissenting.28
In speaking for the majority of the Court, Mr. Justice Murphy
reviewed the history of the writ of habeas corpus as the judicial method
for lifting ·undue restraints upon personal liberty but noted that in
recent years many procedural problems had arisen especially in federal
courts.
In this particular case, Murphy held that the question of whether
or not petitioner should be granted the right to argue his appeal in
person was within the power of the Court of Appeals and that
this right was within the meaning of section 262 of the Judicial Code
providing that the Supreme Court and courts of appeals as well
as the district courts shall have power to issue all writs not specifically
provided for by statute "which may be necessary for the exercise of
their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the usages and principles
of law."29
He pointed out that the rule that habeas corpus could be used
only where necessary to appellate jurisdiction must be considered in
the light of the proviso that such writ "is available in those exceptional
cases 'where, because of special circumstances, its use as an aid to an
appeal over which the court has jurisdiction may fairly be said to be
reasonably necessary in the interest of justice.' "30
It was clear to the majority of the Court that this case came within
the rule concerning the exceptional cases. After a careful review of
the common law in regard to habeas corpus, Murphy concluded:
"In short, we do not read §262 as an ossification of the practice and
procedure of more than a century and a half ago. Rather it is a
27 Price v. Johnston, (C.C.A. 9th, 1947) 159 F. (2d) 234.
28 Price v. Johnston, (C.C.A. 9th, 1947) 161 F. (2d) 705.
29 Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 at 278-279, 68 S.Ct. 1049 (1948).
"(JUDICIAL CoDE, section 262). PoWER TO IssUE WmTs.-The Supreme

Court and
the district courts shall have power to issue writs of scire facias. The Supreme Court,
the.circuit courts of appeals, and the district courts shall have power to issue all writs
not specifically provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their
respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C.A.
(1928, Supp. 1948) §377, p. 64.
so 334 U.S. 266 at 279, 68 S.Ct. 1049 (1948).
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legislatively approved source of procedural instruments designed to
achieve the 'rational ends of law'. . . . We accordingly look to the
usages and principles which have attached themselves to the writ
of habeas corpus down through the years to the present time." 31
The majority opinion then stated that it must be emphasized that
the power of a court of appeals to issue such a writ is discretionary,
and its discretion must be examined "with the best interests of both
the prisoner and the government in mind. . . . Section 262, in other
words, does not justify an indiscriminate opening of the prison gates to
allow all those who so desire to argue their own appeals."32
The Ninth Circuit was found to have been in error in deciding that
it was without power to issue the writ. Finally, it was emphasized that:
'We are not unaware of the many problems caused by the
numerous and successive habeas corpus petitions filed by prisoners. But the answer is not to be found in repeated denials of
petitions without leave to amend or without the prisoners having
an opportunity to defend against their alleged abuses of the writ.
That only encourages the filing of more futile petitions. The very
least that can and should be done is to make habeas corpus proceedings in district courts more meaningful and decisive, making
clear just what issues are determined and for what reasons."33
As to the amendment to the fourth petition alleging that the Government knowingly used false testimony at the trial, Murphy pointed out
that, although the Government argued in the Supreme Court that it
was a mere allegation of law unsupported by facts, this question had
not been passed upon by the lower courts but that the petition had been
dismissed on the ground of the petitioner's alleged abuse of the writ
of habeas corpus by filing four successive petitions. It was pointed out
that petitioner had made every effort to raise the due process issue set
forth in Mooney v. Holohan34 and that there had been no proper
occasion prior to the fourth petition for the District Court to have passed
upon this question. Whether or not petitioner had any evidence on
this point was not before the District Court because the petition was
dismissed without hearing. The majority of the Supreme Court held
that petitioner was entitled either to be heard on the present pleadings
or permitted to amend and clarify his petition in the District Court,
and that "appellate courts cannot make factual determinations which
31 Id. at 282-283.
32 Id. at 284-285.
83 Id. at 293.
34 294 U.S. 103,

55 S.Ct. 340 (1935).
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may be decisive of vital rights where the crucial facts have not been
developed." 35
Finally, it was pointed out that prisoners who are unfamiliar with
the law and complicated rules of pleading are very often forced to act
in their own behalf and that the courts cannot impose on them the
same high standards of the legal art which are placed on members of
the legal profession, and that "especially is this true in a case like this
where the imposition of those standards would have a retroactive and
prejudicial effect on the prisoner's inartistically drawn petition."36
The dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in which Mr.
Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Reed and Jackson concurred, as well
as the dissenting opinion of Justice Jackson, urged that a consideration
of the three prior petitions along with the fourth demonstrated that
the latter petition was without merit and could have merit only if
petitioner had stated in his pleadings that there was newly discovered
matter or that there were circumstances which could satisfactorily
explain the reason for not raising such matters in the previous petitions.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, while not agreeing with Mr. Justice
Jackson that the Court of Appeals was without power to issue the
necessary writ to bring petitioner before it, nevertheless disagreed with
the majority opinion that the writ should be used to bring a prisoner
before the Court for the purpose of arguing his own case.
During the same term, the Court again divided 5-4 on the availability of habeas corpus as a remedy in the federal courts. In the case
of Wade v. Mayo 37 petitioner had been convicted of the charge of
breaking and entering, and the conviction was affirmed on appeal to
the Supreme Court of Florida. A petition for habeas corpus had been
filed in the trial court and appealed to the Supreme Court of Florida in
order to exhaust state remedies. Thereafter, a petition for writ of
habeas corpus was filed in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida alleging that the refusal to appoint counsel
at the trial deprived petitioner of his constitutional right to due process
of law. Petitioner pointed out that this particular point had not been
raised in the appeal from the conviction because two Florida cases had
previously ruled that the Supreme Court of Florida was without power
to reverse for failure to appoint counsel except in capital cases.
The District Court granted the writ; a hearing was held and a
ruling was made that the conviction was in violation of the due process
35

334 U.S. 266 at 291, 68 S.Ct. 1049 (1948).

so Id. at 292.
37

334 U.S. 672, 68 S.Ct. 1270 (1948).
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clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the Fifth Circuit reversed on the grounds that the Fourteenth Amendment did not require
the appointment of counsel in non-capital state cases unless the state
law so required.38 Subsequent to these decisions the Florida Supreme
Court decided that the question of non-appointment of counsel could
be raised by means of habeas corpus proceedings.39
Mr. Justice Murphy approached the problem by examining the
rule requiring the exhaustion of state remedies. After procedure in
state courts has been exhausted there is a choice between applying for
certiorari in the Supreme Court or habeas corpus in a federal district
court. And prompt and orderly procedure will often require that the
prisoner must first seek review in the Supreme Court and where this
is not done it may be a relevant consideration for a district court in
determining whether to entertain a petition for habeas corpus. But
Mr. Justice Murphy pointed out that application to the Supreme Court
for certiorari is not in any real sense a part of the state procedure but
"is an invocation of federal authority growing out of the supremacy
of the Federal Constitution and the necessity of giving effect to that
supremacy if the state processes have failed to do so."40
Mr. Justice Murphy once again showed a determination not to
permit the writ of habeas corpus to be li'mited by rigid procedural rules.
His opinion recognized that writs of certiorari are matters of grace.
This discretion frequently results in writs being denied without consideration of the merits, and "good judicial administration is not
furthered by insistence on futile procedure."41
In the dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Reed took the position that
the principle of exhausting state remedies required application for
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court pointing out that:
'Where there is a denial of constitutional rights by the highest court
of a state, a remedy exists by direct review in this Court."42 On the
other hand, Murphy insisted that "the flexible nature of the writ of
habeas corpus counsels against erecting a rigid procedural rule that has
the effect of imposing a new jurisdictional limitation on the writ."43
Although the majority increased from 5-4 in Price v. Johnston to
6-3 in Wade v. Mayo, the split became more apparent in Taylor v.
(C.C.A. 5th, 1946) 158 F. (2d) 614.
158 Fla. 264, 28 S. (2d) 585 (1946).
40 334 U.S. 672 at 680, 68 S.Ct. 1270 (1948).
41 Id. at 681.
42 Id. at 694.
43 Id. at 681.
38

30
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Alahama44 and Taylor 11. Dennis.45 Taylor had been convicted of rape
and sentenced to death by the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama. His conviction was affirmed on appeal to the Supreme Court
of Alabama. Shortly thereafter he told an attorney, who had been
called into the case after the appeal, that the confession used to convict
him was secured by force and duress and that because of fear he had
been afraid to tell this to his court-appointed lawyer. Affidavits were
secured from Taylor and from three men who were prisoners in the
local jail at the time the confession was obtained.
In conformance with Alabama procedure, a petition was filed with
the Supreme Court of Alabama requesting permission to file a petition
for coram nobis in the trial court. The State :filed a motion to dismiss
and, at the hearing on this motion, produced photographs of the body
of the petitioner alleged to have been taken shortly after the beatings
were alleged to have occurred. The Supreme Court of Alabama,
by a vote of 6-1, refused to permit the petition for writ of error coram
nobis to be :6.led.46
The Supreme Court split 4-1-347 on this case with' the majority
opinion by Mr. Justice Burton upholding the action of the Supreme
Court of Alabama in denying the petition as not being a denial of due
process of law. The majority held that the Alabama Supreme Court
was correct in not considering the case as if it had been submitted
on demurrer but rather that the court was justified in examining the
record in the trial itself and other materials to determine the reasonableness of the allegations.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, made it clear
that he agreed with the decision of the lower court in deciding that
the allegations of the petition were beyond belief. However, he pointed
out: "There is not now before us any right that the petitioner may
have under the Judicial Code to bring an independent habeas corpus
proceeding in the District Court of the United States."48
Murphy, in a dissenting opinion, once again made his position
clear. Instead of looking first to technical procedural matters of state
corrective machinery, he examined the constitutional principle that
no conviction in a state court is valid which is based in whole or in
part upon an involuntary confession.
335 U.S. 252, 68 S.Ct. 1415 (1948).
336 U.S. 907, 69 S.Ct. 510 (1949).
46 Ex parte Taylor, 249 Ala. 667, 32 S. (2d) 659 (1947).
47 Mr. Justice Black did not participate in this case.
48 Taylor v. Alabama, 335 U.S. 252 at 274, 68 S.Ct. 1415 (1948).
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"This principle reflects the common abhorrence of compelling
any man, innocent or guilty, to give testimony against himself in
a criminal proceeding. It is a principle which was written into the
Constitution because of the belief that to torture and coerce an
individual into confessing a crime, even though that individual
be guilty, is to endanger the rights and liberties of all persons
accused of crime. History has shown that once tyrannical methods
of law enforcement are permitted as to one man such methods
are invariably used as to others. Brutality knows no distinction
between the innocent and the guilty. And those who suffer most
from these inquisitorial processes are the friendless, the ignorant,
the poor and the despised. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
237-238. To guard against this evil, therefore, the Constitution
requires that a conviction be set aside whenever it appears that a
confession introduced at the trial is involuntary in nature."49
This approach to the problem involved made it clear to the minority
of the Court that the case should have been reversed because the
petitioner had in fact not had a hearing on his allegations of denial
of constitutional rights.
'The problem in this case is whether the petitioner, having
been found guilty of rape and sentenced to death, is now entitled
to a hearing on his allegation that the confession introduced at
the trial was obtained by coercive methods. The Supreme Court
of Alabama refused to allow a hearing on the theory that the
allegation was unreasonable. In affirming that refusal, however,
this Court relies upon considerations which are either irrelevant,
inconclusive or contrary to the constitutional principle just discussed."50

If petitioner's allegations were in fact true his conviction and death
sentence were in violation of the Constitution. The effect of the rule
as laid down in the majority opinion is that these allegations can never
be proved. Under the rule urged by Murphy, the petitioner would
be given an opportunity to prove these allegations. In one case the
quality of justice by the Alabama courts remains in doubt. In the
other the doubt would be resolved one way or the other.
The serious effect of the rule of the majority in Taylor v. Alabama,
supra, is demonstrated in Taylor v. Dennis, supra, where the Court,
by an even division, upheld the denial of a petition for writ of habeas
corpus by the District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. 51
49 Id. at 275.
50 Ibid.
51 336 U.S. 907,

69 S.Ct. 510 (1949).
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The District Court had dismissed the petition without a hearing on
the merits on the basis of the prior state court proceedings.
This decision temporarily at least impairs the effectiveness of the
prior decisions of Murphy and other Justices who have consistently
opposed efforts to limit the availability of the writ of habeas corpus
in federal courts.
Mr. Justice Murphy's impassioned dissent in the Yamashita case52
is not only a fine example of his important contribution to judicial
writing and to the development of the Court in these confusing times;
it serves also to demonstrate that ever present strain of his humane
conviction and sincere devotion to concepts of natural justice, which
are the basis of the professional criticism of his judicial craftsmanship.
Murphy might not have had Holmes' genius for logical exegesis,
which could destroy a generation of fuzzy thinking with a single
sentence. But Murphy did have a profound feeling for the social
problems of his day, and for the people whose lives were to be affected
by his decisions. He could and did write forcefully, simply, and when
the emotional pitch demanded, eloquently. And to reach the right
result uniformly, he could select and marshal the judicial precedents
in a clear and workmanlike manner.
In his Yamashita dissent he began with an obviously difficult task;
he had been Governor General of the Philippines and felt a strong
emotional tie with the unfortunate people who, at the hands of the
Japanese, had been the victims of unspeakable war atrocities. But his
devotion to eternal constitutional principles of due process and his
belief that the guarantee of a fair trial superseded all motives of
vengeance and retaliation evoked all the fire and eloquence of the
zealot.
The first long section of his dissenting opinion is devoted to the
proposition that the Fifth Amendment should be applicable to all
crimes committed within the federal orbit. This is followed by the
argument that the scope of judicial review should be enlarged on
habeas corpus petitions, especially in review of military cases. At- this
point, however, Justice Murphy, after having devoted several pages
to an analysis of what the Fifth Amendment should do, recapitulates
and says: "But for the purposes of this case I accept the scope of review
recognized by the Court at this time."53 Then he launches into the
specific problems raised by the petition, and, together with his brother
Rutledge, makes out a highly plausible, technical argument to support
the proposition which his fundamental judicial feelings dictated.
52 In re Yamashita,
53 Id. at 31.

327 U.S. 1 at 26, 66 S.Ct. 340 (1946).
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The decision of the Supreme Court on application for habeas
corpus, prohibition and certiorari cannot be properly evaluated without
a thorough consideration of the powerful and impassioned dissents of
Justices Murphy and Rutledge. The Court had nothing before it but
a question of jurisdiction. As precedent, In re Yamashita is significant
in that it indicates how much latitude will be given to the military in
the trial of war crimes in time of war.
Purely as a matter of statutory consa;uction, Mr. Justice Rutledge
might have seemed to have the better of the argument as to the applicability of Article of War 25 which by its language prohibits the use of
depositions in capital cases before military commissions. Murphy's
attack upon the vagueness of the charge, however, is also highly persuasive; a finding of guilty was possible without proof of any connection
between Yamashita and the unspeakable acts of the troops in Manila
other than the fact of nominal command. Yet the majority opinion
has been plausibly defended as having reached a desirable result from
the point of view of the necessities of military jurisdiction in time of
war. 54 Of course in evaluating the result in tl1e case, it must be remembered that the Court was not concerned vvith the guilt or innocence
of the petitioner. The central issue was whether the petitioner could
invalidate his conviction by the military tribunal on the ground that
it had failed to afford him the procedural safeguards which the Constitution provides.
Murphy's introduction and peroration in the Yamashita case may
not add to legal scholarship, but it is judicial forensic literature of the
highest order:
"That there were brutal atrocities inflicted upon the helpless
Filipino people, to whom tyranny is no stranger, by Japanese
armed forces under the petitioner's command is undeniable. .Starvation, execution or massacre without trial, torture, rape, murder
and wanton destruction of property were foremost among the
outright violations of the laws of war and of the conscience of
a civilized world. That just punishment should be meted out to all
those responsible for criminal acts of this nature is also beyond
dispute. But these factors do not answer the problem in this case.
They do not justify the abandonment of our devotion to justice
in dealing with a fallen enemy commander. To conclude otherwise is to admit that the enemy has lost the battle but has destroyed our ideals.
'War breeds atrocities. From the earliest conflicts of recorded
history to the global struggles of modem times inhumanities, lust
114 Fairman, "The Supreme Court on Militaiy Jurisdiction: Martial Rule in Hawaii
and the Yamashita Case," 59 HARv. L. REv. 833 (1946).
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and pillage have been the inevitable by-products of man's resort
to force and arms. Unfortunately, such despicable acts have a
dangerous tendency to call forth primitive impulses of vengeance
and retaliation among the victimized peoples. The satisfaction of
such impulses in tum breeds resentment and fresh tension. Thus
does the spiral of cruelty and hatred grow."55
Murphy made a great contribution toward a meaningful enforcement of the constitutional prohibition against unlawful searches and
seizures. In Harris v. United States56 it appeared that Harris was
arrested by federal officers and his home ransacked without a search
warrant up.til an envelope was found in a bedroom containing evidence
of another crime. The conviction for the crime involving this evidence
was sustained by a five to four decision.
Murphy, in a vigorous dissenting opinion, pointed out that such
a decision permitting unlimited searching of premises where a valid
arrest is made would destroy the constitutional right involved:
"Under today's decision, a warrant of arrest for a particular
crime authorizes an unlimited search of one's home from cellar
to attic for evidence of 'anything' that might come to light,
whether bearing on the crime charged or any other crime. A
search warrant is not only unnecessary; it is a hindrance."57
On the other hand, Murphy insisted that "the mere fact that a man
has been validly arrested does not give the arresting officers untrammeled freedom to search every cranny and nook for anything that
might have some relation to the alleged crime or, indeed, to any crime
whatsoever."58
In the Trupiano case59 Murphy, in the majority opinion, while distinguishing the Harris case, nevertheless succeeded in clarifying a portion of the rule in the Harris case as follows:
"A search or seizure without a warrant as an incident to a
lawful arrest has always been considered to be a strictly limited
right. It grows out of the inherent necessities of the situation at
the time of the arrest. But there must be something more in the
way of necessity than merely a lawful arrest. The mere fact that
there is a valid arrest does not ipso facto legalize a search or seizure without a warrant. Carroll v. United States, supra ... [267
U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280 (1925)]. Otherwise the exception swallows the general principle, making a search warrant completely
55 327 U.S. 1 at 29,
56 331 U.S. 145, 67
57 Id. at 190.

58 Id.

66 S.Ct. 340 (1946).
S.Ct. 1098 (1946).

at 186.
v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 68 S.Ct. 1229 (1948).

59 Trupiano
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unnecessary wherever there is a lawful arrest. And so there must
be some other factor in the situation that would make it unreasonable or impracticable to require the arresting officer to equip himself with a search warrant. In the case before us, however, no
reason whatever has been shown why the arresting officers could
not have armed themselves during all the weeks of their surveillance of the locus with a duly obtained search warrant-no
reason, that is, except indifference to the legal process for search
and seizure which the Constitution contemplated."60
In Wolf v. Colorado61 the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Murphy
again demonstrated his keen determination to require governmental
officials to recognize individual rights. The majority opinion decided
that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited states from making unreasonable searches and seizures, but that the rule that such evidence
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment could not be used in
federal courts did not prevent the use of such evidence seized in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment from being used in state courts.
Murphy's position was clear. The constitutional protection had to
be given real meaning. He pointed out:
· "The conclusion is inescapable that but one remedy exists to
deter violations of the search and seizure clause. That is the rule
which excludes illegally obtained evidence. Only by exclusion
can we impress upon the zealous prosecutor that violation of the
Constitution will do him no good. And only when that point is
driven home can the prosecutor be expected to emphasize the importance of observing constitutional demands in his instructions
to the police."62
Once again, in the Schneiderman case,63 Murphy demonstrated his
determination to protect individual rights and to marshal legal support
for them. Twelve years after Schneiderman was naturalized the Government sought to denaturalize him. The minority of the Court believed that in the review of denaturalization proceedings the same issues
would be present as in a review of a naturalization proceeding.
On the other hand, Murphy looked to the rights of the naturalized
citizen and his right to freedom of thought and expression. He then ·
set forth the rules which should be followed in such hearings and said
that the statute governing such proceedings should not be so construed
as to "circumscribe liberty of political thought." He cautioned that:
oo Id. at 708.
338 U.S. 25, 69 S.Ct. 1359 (1949).
62Jd. at 44.
63 Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 63 S.Ct. 1333 (1943).
61
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"Were the law otherwise, valuable rights would rest upon a
slender reed, and the security of the status of our naturalized
citizens might depend in considerable degree upon the political
temper of majority thought and the stresses of the times. Those
are consequences foreign to the best traditions of this nation and
the characteristics of our institutions." 64

In dissenting in the case of Baumgartner 11. United States65 Murphy
made it clear that his views were even broader than those expressed
in the Schneiderman case:
"American citizenship is not a right granted on a condition
subsequent that the naturalized citizen refrain in the future from
uttering any remark or adopting an attitude favorable to his original homeland or those there in power, no matter how distasteful
such conduct may be to most of us. He is not required to imprison
himself in an intellectual or spiritual straight-jacket; nor is he
obliged to retain a static mental attitude. Moreover, he does not
lose the precious right of citizenship because he subsequently dares
to criticize his adopted government in vituperative or defamatory
terms." 66
Mr. Justice Murphy's contributions to the law of the land as to the
validity of distinctions based on race or ancestry are unique: In this field
his experience as Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and his
part as judge in the famous Sweet trial in Detroit gave to him the
necessary first-hand knowledge of the extent to which racial hostility
could defeat the ends of justice. This background along with Murphy's deep-rooted sense of justice gave to the Supreme Court a man
determined to oppose every governmental act which was tainted in
whole or in part by racial considerations.
Although there were not many cases specifically involving the rights
of Negroes during Murphy's term, his record was consistently in favor
of freedom of the individual and in opposition to all types of governmental oppression. In both the white primary case,67 and the restrictive covenant cases,68 Murphy joined the Court in invalidating governmentally imposed racial restrictions.
In the case of Screws 11. United States, 69 there were four opinions
64 Id.

at 159.
322 U.S. 665, 64 S.Ct. 1240 (1944). See also: Knauer v. United States, 328
U.S. 654, 66 S.Ct. 1304 (1946) and Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 69 S.Ct.
384 (1949).
66 332 U.S. 665 at 679, 64 S.Ct. 1240 (1944).
67 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 64 S.Ct. 757 (1944).
68 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. l, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S.
24, 68 S.Ct. 847 (1948).
69 325 U.S. 91, 65 S.Ct. 1031 (1945).
65
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with the majority reversing the conviction of a peace officer of Georgia
who had clubbed a Negro to death through malice. However, Murphy,
in his dissenting opinion, set forth his belief that the Federal Government should intervene in cases of this type, because it was clear that
the Negro who had been killed had been denied his life without due
process and under color of state law. In doing so, he pointed out: "Too
often unpopular minorities, such as Negroes, are unable to :6.nd effective refuge from the cruelties of bigoted and ruthless authority. States
are undoubtedly capable of punishing their officers who commit such
outrages but where, as here, the states are unwilling for some reason
to prosecute such crimes the Federal Government must step in unless
constitutional guarantees are to become atrophied."70
In the case of Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co.71 the Court
declared invalid the practice of railroad brotherhoods in discriminating
against Negro :6.remen. Once again, Mr. Justice Murphy felt it necessary to restate in a concurring opinion his belief as to the relative
position of the right of minority groups to be free from oppression.
To him, the important point was that "the utter disregard of the dignity
and the well-being of colored citizens shown by this record is so pronounced as to demand the invocation of constitutional condemnation."72 He therefore objected to the opinion in the case which analyzed
the statute "solely upon the basis of legal niceties," without considering
the more basic right involved.
In the cases concerning the treatment of Japanese-Americans during
the last war, Murphy, in concurring with the majority in the Hirabayashi case73 made it clear that "distinctions based on color and ancestry are utterly inconsistent with our traditions and ideals."74 At the
same time, he made it clear that while he concurred with the decision
in this case, he believed that the action in approving the curfew for
Japanese-Americans during the period of extreme emergency went "to
the very brink of constitutional power." 75
This case was followed by the Korematsu case76 and Ex Parte
Endo.77 In these cases, Murphy dissented in the :6.rst and concurred
in the second on the grounds that the action complained of was beyond
"the very brink of constitutional power and falls into the ugly abyss
70Jd. at 138.
11323 U.S. 192, 65 S.Ct. 226 (1944).
12 Id. at 208.
73 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 63 S.Ct. 1375 (1943).
74Jd. at 110.
75Jd. at 111.
76Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 65 S.Ct. 193 (1944).
77 323 U.S. 283, 65 S.Ct. 208 (1944).
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of racism." 78 In his dissenting opinion in the Korematsu case,
Murphy in most vigorous terms set forth his resentment against govern. mental action in subjecting individuals to oppression because of the disloyal action of other members of the group. The warning set forth by
Mr. Justice Murphy in the Korematsu case will no doubt be quoted over
and over again:
"I dissent, therefore, from this legalization of racism. Racial discrimination in any form and in any degree has no justifiable part
whatever in our democratic way of life. It is unattractive in any
setting but it is utterly revolting among a free people who have embraced the principles set forth in the Constitution of the United
States. All residents of this nation are kin in some way by blood
or culture to a foreign land. Yet they are primarily and necessarily
a part of the new and distinct civilization of the United States.
They must accordingly be treated at all times as the heirs of the
American experiment and as entitled to all the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution." 79

Conclusion
In many respects, Mr. Justice Murphy represented the trend of
the present day _Supreme Court toward giving further recognition to
the rights of individuals. On many occasions he joined with the majority in upholding these rights. In many other instances he joined
in dissenting opinions which state that these rights be upheld. Mr.
Justice Murphy will be remembered for his consistency in insisting,
and his determination, that the rights of individuals be free from
oppression. Although Murphy did not succeed in all of these efforts,
he did succeed in placing individual rights in such perspective as to
require the consideration of these rights by the majority in cases where
he found himself in the minority.
Whereas there have been others who have had the zeal for protecting individual rights and whereas there have been others who have
demonstrated their ability as judges, Mr. Justice Murphy stands out
as one who had a firm conviction that the Constitution and laws
of this country demanded the protection of individual rights. His
ability to place individual rights within the orthodox legal framework of our country is a contribution for which we will forever be
indebted.
1s 323 U.S. 214 at 233, 65 S.Ct. 193 (1944).
10 Id. at 242.

